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The aim of this paper is to take some steps towards determining 
what makes an assent an assent of faith. The opening steps will 
bring into view a set of three kinds of assent, namely opinative 
assent or opinion, evident assent, and assent of faith, this with 
the purpose of directing our attention more precisely to the kind 
of assent that is at issue. The approach will benefit from 
guidance provided by some late-medieval logicians and theolo-
gians, including John Mair, George Lokert, Gervaise Waim, and 
Nicolas Francus of Vimeu.1 This part of the discussion will 
emphasise an assent of faith that is inseparable from, and indeed 
arises out of, an exercise of reason. I shall then argue that this 
concept of ‘assent of faith’ is vulnerable to attack by Pascal and 
Shestov on the basis of their teaching on the apparent mutual 
exclusivity of faith and reason with respect to some acts of faith.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  	   John Mair (c.1467-1550), In primum Sententiarum, (Paris 1519); George 
Lokert (c.1485-1547), Scriptum in materia noticiarum (Paris 1514); Gervaise 
Waim (c.1491- 1554), Tractatus noticiarum, (Paris 1528); Nicolas Francus (fl. 
1500s), Tres hecatonomie Nicolai Franci Vimacui de conceptibus (Paris 
c.1509). The first three were students at and also taught at the University of 
Paris (and elsewhere also) during the first half of the sixteenth century. I do 
not have details of the professional career of Nicolas Francus; however, he 
attended the University of Paris, and was an associate of Philippe Prévost, 
regent in Arts at the Collège du Cardinal Lemoine. For discussion of Mair and 
Lokert on the assent of faith see A. Broadie, ‘Assentiment et volonté: la pré-
Réforme écossaise’, in Croit-on comme on veut, éd. Laurent Jaffro, Paris: Vrin, 
2014, pp.103-15; and for discussion of all four late-medieval philosophers on 
the assent of faith see A. Broadie, Notion and Object: Aspects of Late-
Medieval Epistemology, Oxford: Clarendon, 1989, 125-78.	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To start with assent broadly understood: it is possible to 
grasp or apprehend the sense of a proposition without also 
judging that things are as the proposition signifies them to be. 
There are at least two elements in this analysis, first apprehen-
sion, and secondly a judgment, where the apprehension is 
expressible in the form of a proposition signifying a given state 
of affairs, and the judgment is an acknowledgement that things 
are indeed as the proposition signifies them to be. The kind of 
judgment here described is what, in accordance with modern 
and also late-medieval practice, I shall term ‘assent’ (Latin 
assensus).  
What motivates the move from apprehension to assent? 
There are three answers that correspond to the aforementioned 
three kinds of assent, namely opinion, evident assent and assent 
of faith. I shall deal with these in turn. First, ‘opinion’ is a 
technical term commonly used by late-medieval logicians to 
signify a judgment drawn as a conclusion from premisses that 
are sufficient to yield a probable conclusion. The concept of 
opinion here envisaged may not precisely match the modern use 
of the term ‘opinion’, and it is the concept as defined here by 
late-medieval thinkers that is relevant. It has therefore to be 
noted that probable arguments are rational acts. Typical of them 
are arguments whose premisses include a witness statement, say, 
or an auctoritas, an authoritative text such as an assertion by 
Aristotle or St Augustine. The concluding assent is reasonable, 
in this sense, that not only is there a reason for the assenter to 
say yes, but further, the reasoner has made that reason his own, 
so that the reason has become his reason for saying yes. His 
reason is set out in the premisses. But the assenter recognises 
that the conclusion, though probable, is not certain, since 
evidence, such as a witness’s testimony, is defeasible, even if it 
is strong enough to make it appear more likely than not that the 
testimony is true. So the concluding assent is hesitant, there is a 
holding-back or a self-restraint by the assenter. The Latin term 
routinely used in this context for ‘hesitant’ is formidolosus, 
which can also, and more literally, be translated as ‘fearful’or 
‘timid’ – no doubt because the kind of assent at issue is given by 
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people who fear that they may be wrong. To the aforementioned 
two characteristics of opinion, (1) the basis in reason and (2) the 
hesitancy of the assent, a third characteristic was regularly 
added, namely the fact that the assent has a natural cause, a 
movement of the intellect unaided by a free cause, a movement 
of the will. I shall say more about this distinction later when I 
turn to the assent of faith.  
A second sort of assent is ‘evident assent’, where the term 
‘evident’ is to be understood in a way highly consistent with its 
etymological root, videre (to see). We give evident assent to a 
proposition if we see the proposition to be true. Among the 
characteristics of such assent are, first, that it is firm or is 
unhesitant (sine formidine), a term that is used, John Mair 
informs us, to exclude suspicion and conjecture’.2 Secondly ‘it is 
caused by causes that necessitate the cognitive power (sc. the 
intellect)’.3 A third criterion, implicit in the second, is that the 
causality of these necessitating causes is natural, a qualification 
that is intended to exclude the will as a possible cause of evident 
assent. In a sense the etymology of ‘evident’ itself indicates the 
exclusion of the role of the will. We open our eyes, immediately 
see some object, and immediately judge the object to be present.  
I turn now to the third of the three sorts of assent, the assent 
of faith, which is an assent (1) which is given to a proposition 
that is the conclusion of a probable argument and given because 
of the agent’s apprehension of the argument, and (2) which is 
given firmly or without hesitation. Faith is therefore, in a sense, 
intermediate between opinion and evident assent in so far as it 
shares its first characteristic with opinion and shares its second 
with evident assent. This position, shared by many late-
medievals, is backed by an authoritative text of Aquinas’s: 
‘Faith is intermediate. For it exceeds opinion in that it is held 
firmly, and it falls short of knowledge in that it is of the 
invisible (non habet visionem).’4 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  Dicitur … sine formidine ad excludendam suspitionem (et) coniecturam. Mair, 
1 Sent., 6 verso, col.1. 
3  Assensus evidens est … natus causari a causis necessitantibus ipsam 
potentiam cognitivam…’ Lokert, Noticiarum, sig.e, 8 verso. 
4  Summa Theologiae 1a2ae, 67, 3 c.	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But this set of criteria of assent of faith seems in tension 
with itself and is perhaps even self-contradictory. The tension at 
issue will pursue us through this paper. Let me make a start on it 
by asking the obvious question: how it is possible for an assent 
of faith to be firm or unhesitant if its foundation is only a 
probable argument, and not, say, a logical demonstration or an 
unmediated insight? Alternatively we might put the question the 
other way round and ask how the assent of faith can be based on 
nothing more than a probable argument if the concluding assent 
itself is firm or unhesitant. The answer to both questions is that 
we need to revisit the easily-made claim that the assent of faith 
is intermediate between opinion and evident assent, and 
challenge it on the grounds that whereas the latter two kinds of 
assent are produced by a natural cause in that they are caused by 
a movement of the intellect, the assent of faith is freely caused, 
for it is produced by a movement of the will. From which it 
follows that the assent of faith is not on the same logical plane 
as opinative assent and evident assent. 
This seems to me a well-founded challenge, to which I shall 
now begin to respond by enquiring what it is that the will wills 
when the outcome of its willing is an assent of faith. The will 
cannot transform a probable argument into a demonstrative 
argument, for the outcome of that transformation would be 
evident assent. In giving evident assent the assenter lays claim 
to knowledge, but there is a long tradition of regarding 
knowledge and faith as mutually exclusive. It is precisely where 
knowledge is not achievable that there is space available for 
faith. Or, to use the language of the bible, faith is in things that 
cannot be seen. To return to my question, therefore: What does 
will have to will to produce faith? The answer is that the will 
wills that firm or assured assent should be given to the 
conclusion of a probable argument, not indirectly by means of 
the transformation of the argument into a demonstration, but 
instead directly by the will’s reinforcing or confirming or 
strengthening of the uncertain, hesitant or timid assent that is the 
appropriate outcome of a probable argument. To use an 
architectural metaphor, the will is a kind of flying buttress 
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supporting the opinative conclusion of a probably argument and 
giving concluding assent a degree of firmness it could not 
receive from the premisses alone, while at the same time the act 
of will could not be classed as an additional premiss.  
But if, as a result of this act of the will, the assent given to 
the conclusion of the probable argument has the assurance 
befitting an assent to the conclusion of a demonstration, we are 
entitled to ask what constitutes the foundation of that assurance 
or firmness. After all, the rational foundation of the conclusion 
remains merely a probable argument. The only new element is 
the movement of the will, and that movement is neither a new 
premiss nor is it derived from new premisses. To be clear, if 
there were new premisses and if these sufficiently strengthened 
or confirmed the assent, the assenter would have not faith but 
knowledge. It appears therefore that it is the bare willing of the 
confirmation, and not any new premiss that the assenter brings 
to the conclusion, that constitutes the difference between the 
hesitancy of an opinion and the assurance of an assent of faith. 
On this analysis an assent of faith is both reasonable and 
unreasonable. It is reasonable to the extent that the conclusion to 
which assent is given is supported by a probable argument, and 
it is unreasonable to the extent that the firmness or assurance of 
the assent of faith is not supported by any argument, for the only 
argument that the assenter has is the probable argument which, 
by its nature, does not support a firm conclusion. If we are being 
unreasonable in so far as we are doing something which we 
cannot justify by any argument, then unreasonableness is not an 
obstacle to faith; on the contrary, it is necessary for it. In short, 
on this analysis, one disturbing feature of faith is its resolute 
resistance to the colonising activities of reason. For even granted 
that an assent of faith has a foundation in a probable argument, 
the last and defining step in the act towards the assent of faith, 
namely the movement of the will, cannot be colonised by reason 
without the concluding assent being an assent not of faith but of 
knowledge. However, I should like to suggest a weakness in this 
line of argument. As a first move I shall say what I take to be 
the relation between intellect and will. My account is influenced 
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by that of Duns Scotus. I shall not however raise questions 
concerning Scotus’s explicit qualification of will as a rational 
faculty. 
The intellect, faced with the practical question: ‘What shall 
I do?’, conceives a plan or a line of action which it takes to be 
the best answer to the question, and duly presents the plan to the 
will. How does the will respond? We can’t be certain in advance 
since the will is free, by which I mean that it is open to 
opposites, in that, whatever it does in response to the intellect’s 
proposal, it is possible for it to do something else instead, or 
even to do nothing (if that is not included in ‘doing something 
else instead’). This openness is in contrast to causal relations 
between objects lacking a will. The sun heats a stone, and at that 
moment and in that circumstance it cannot not. Of course the 
sun can do many things, bleach and blacken things, harden and 
melt things, and so on, but at any given moment it is not open to 
doing anything other than it does. The contrast is covered by the 
medieval tag: ‘Natura ad unum, voluntas ad opposita – Nature is 
towards a single thing, the will is towards opposites.’ This 
position implies a rejection of determinism, including intellec-
tual determinism. Hence the relation of the movement of the 
intellect to the movement of the will is not the relation of a 
natural cause to a natural effect. The effect is free, in which case 
the intellect’s proposal has the status of advice or a suggestion 
or a recommendation, or even of a command (for one can 
disobey, as well as obey commands) and not the status of an 
efficient cause. But if, throughout this process, the will remains 
open to opposites, then the ‘yes’ (if ‘yes’ is its response), is not 
wholly the voice of reason or the intellect. Instead something 
that is non-reason directly moves the agent to act.  
This, however, does not imply that the resultant act is not 
reasonable – far from it. For if the intellect recommends an 
intellectually defensible plan as the practical answer to the 
practical question, and the agent accomplishes what the intellect 
recommends, then the agent’s act is thereby informed by the 
concept worked out by the intellect, and to that extent the act is 
reasonable; the agent has done what you would expect a 
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reasonable person to do. Of course, there may be a very 
different outcome. Even though the proposal presented to the 
will by the intellect is reasonable, the will may reject the 
proposal and instead will something utterly crazy. This can 
happen to all of us – we can do the craziest things even while 
knowing them to be crazy. That’s the price you pay for being 
human. Of course, most often we don’t do crazy things, we do 
reasonable ones because we are reasonable. Furthermore, as I 
have just argued, the fact that the will is free and therefore 
always goes beyond the intellect, does not mean that every free 
act is unreasonable or irrational. In saying this I am relying on 
the doctrine with which I started, namely that an assent of faith 
is produced by an act of will that wills the reinforcement or 
confirmation of the prior assent to the conclusion of a probable 
argument; from which it follows that the proposition to which 
the assent of faith is given has the support of an piece of 
probable reasoning. 
This doctrine of the nature of faith, considered as the joint 
product of the faculties of intellect and will, that was common 
currency among the late-medieval logicians is clear, elegant and 
deeply rooted in the western theological tradition; but it is also, 
it seems to me, threatened by Pascal, and no less threatened by 
Shestov. The late-medievals do not say that some assents of 
faith satisfy the criteria that they set out; what they say is that 
these are the criteria that any assent has to satisfy if it is to be an 
assent of faith. Pascal, supported by Shestov, produces examples 
of assents of faith that surely could serve as archetypal assents 
of faith, and yet that appear not to satisfy the criteria of my late-
medievals. I shall mention three examples; they concern the 
agony of Jesus in the garden of Gethsemane, the binding of 
Isaac, and original sin, and I shall close by consider the 
underlying fact that drives this Pascalian narrative. (I should add 
that since in this paper I am focusing on religious faith the 
Shestovian examples I use are religious, but it has to be 
remembered that Shestov was not concerned only with religious 
propositions, since his target was the role of reason and 
unreason in our lives, and not only reason and unreason in their 
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interface with religion. It is therefore to be recalled that Shestov 
dedicated two hundred pages of Athènes et Jérusalem to a 
meditation on the hideous torture instrument known as the Bull 
of Phalaris and the extraordinary claim, made by some stoics, 
that a true stoic could be happy even while being roasted inside 
the Bull. 
 The first Pascalian example concerns the event narrated in 
the various Gospel accounts of the agony of Jesus in the Garden 
of Gethsemane.5 Pascal understands the accounts in terms of 
their practical implication: ‘Jesus will be in agony until the end 
of the world. One must not sleep during that time.’6 Shestov 
ponders Pascal’s words for the whole length of a book.7 He is as 
alive as anyone could be to the absurdity of what seems to be 
Pascal’s assumption, namely that human beings are capable of 
staying awake to the end of the world, and Shestov suggests, as 
a possible interpretation of Pascal’s position, a narrative that 
deploys St Augustine’s doctrine of fides implicita. This doctrine 
states that the faithful do not themselves need to be in direct 
communion with heavenly truth; it is instead sufficient if they 
observe the principles declared true by the church. Shestov, 
translating this into what he terms ‘the language of good sense’ 
(le langage du bon sens), declares Pascal’s doctrine to mean that 
humans must of course sleep, even while Jesus is in agony; 
reason, after all, says as much. We are only human and we must 
obey the biological imperative to sleep when exhausted; this is 
not just our right, it is a natural necessity, from which therefore 
no-one, not even Pascal, is exempt.8 Nevertheless, while we are 
awake we are no doubt bound in some measure to suffer agony 
in sympathy with the agony of Jesus, bound in that, in 
contemplating the agony of Jesus, our contemplation cannot be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5  Accounts are to be found in the four Gospels. See Matthew 26, vv.36-56; 
Mark 14, vv. 32-52; Luke 22, vv.40-53; John 18, vv.1-18. 6  Pascal,	  Pensées, présentation et notes par Gérard Ferreyrolles, texte établi par 
Philippe Sellier, Le Livre de Poche: Paris, 2000, pp.573-6. 	  7  Léon Chestov, La Nuit de Gethsémani: Essai sur la philosophie de Pascal. 
Paris; Éditions de l’éclat, 2012. Published also in Léon Chestov, Sur la 
balance de Job, tr. B. de Schloezer, ed. Isabelle de Montmollin, Paris; Le 
Bruit du temps, 2016, pp.433-501. 8  Sur la balance de Job, pp. 440-1.  
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sustained but is instead transformed into endurance, as we 
naturally feel the pain that he must endure, and bound also in 
that, in contemplating his agony, we recognise that we must not 
avert our gaze just in order to live a more comfortable or more 
tranquil life; we are instead bound both religiously and morally 
to be in communion with Jesus in his agony. I think that 
Pascal’s words imply as much.  
Yet, having offered his interpretation in terms of fides 
implicita, which seeks to edge Pascal into the common world 
shared by ‘tous les hommes qui pensent raisonnablement et 
correctement’, 9  Shestov appears to acknowledge that his 
interpretation does not measure up to what Pascal surely has in 
mind, even if he cannot readily articulate what it is that Pascal 
does have in mind. The starting point, as already indicated, is 
that Shestov finds that he cannot subscribe to the crazy idea, 
understood literally, of ‘our staying awake to the end of time’. 
What on earth does or could Pascal mean by this phrase that 
acknowledges its bizarreness while at the same time bestowing 
on it at least an aura of plausibility? Shestov’s interesting 
response is this: ‘It is Aristotle who thought up the theory of the 
“middle [or intermediate]”10 and taught us the great truth that, if 
we aim to keep reason intact we must not exhaust it with 
questions which exceed its powers. Furthermore, Aristotle 
taught us that one should not ask any question whatever in such 
a way as to attack reason’s sovereign rights. For it is he who 
invented the fiction (viz. of eternal truth) that unanswerable 
questions are senseless and therefore unacceptable.’11 Elsewhere 
Shestov adds a detail: ‘Beyond certain limits, man’s curiosity 
becomes inopportune. Aristotle has formulated the position in 
the celebrated words : “To accept nothing without proof is a 
sign of the lack of a philosophical education”.’12 In a word, one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9  Sur la balance de Job, p. 458. 
10  The concept of the middle or intermediate term is central to Aristotle’s theory 
of the syllogism, and therefore to the whole of his logic. It is also central to his 
moral philosophy in so far as he argues on behalf of the ‘doctrine of the mean’, 
viz. that each of the moral virtues occupies a position intermediate between 
two extremes, each extreme a vice.  
11  Sur la balance de Job, p. 465. 
12  Ibid., p. 441. 
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can’t go on forever seeking further light on what Pascal meant. 
It cannot become clear to us in hoc statu because his teaching 
that we must stay awake to the end of time is crazy.  
I wish here to introduce the term ‘absurd’ to make the point 
I have in mind. In general, we use the term ‘absurd’ to signify 
something that is not just false or invalid but also crazy. But 
‘absurd’ is a term with an interesting history and its history 
deserves to be respected. Etymologically speaking, the fact that 
something is absurd does not imply that it is meaningless or 
false or invalid. It implies that it is inaudible. Something absurd 
may in fact make sense and may indeed be true. But to those 
who are deaf the message makes no sense. In response to 
Pascal’s message that we should stay awake till the end of the 
world, Shestov first offers a rather banal interpretation, namely 
his words concerning the concept of fides implicita. But Shestov, 
like Pascal himself, is quite clear that the fact that a theological 
doctrine, when taken au pied de la lettre, is shocking, outra-
geous or crazy, does not mean that theologians are justified in 
taming, domesticating or disarming the doctrine. For in some 
cases domestication is falsification. It is, I think, with this in 
mind, that Shestov declares openly that his fides implicita 
interpretation of Pascal’s account of the agony of Jesus in the 
Garden of Gethsemane is hopelessly inadequate.  
There are things that we cannot understand in this life 
unless blessed with an auxilium speciale. Perhaps Pascal had 
indeed been blessed in this way, and thereafter was reaching 
into language to convey a message that we mortals do not have 
ears to hear. I shall return to this point shortly, but meantime, in 
light of the teaching of the late-medievals, I shall note that since 
reason tells us that it is impossible for human beings to stay 
awake till the end of the world, one cannot give an assent of 
faith, as ‘assent of faith’ is understood by the late-mdievals, to 
the claim that humans can stay awake till the end of the world. 
Pascal is therefore giving his assent of faith to a proposition that 
cannot be supported by a probable argument. 
I turn now from the agony of Jesus in the Garden to the 
biblical narrative concerning the binding of Isaac, but do not 
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thereby move to totally new ground, for in the latter case also 
the biblical event invites us to reject the dictates of reason, 
whose laws are confirmed by countless observations, but whose 
laws seem however to be groundless if the premiss of the 
biblical narrative is to be believed. Abraham, then more than a 
hundred years old, was commanded to kill his only begotten son 
whom he loved, the son through whom Abraham’s seed would 
inherit the earth. A loving father sacrificing his only begotten 
child is an absurdity, and it is also an absurdity that the 
prophecy concerning the inheritance of the earth could be 
fulfilled if Isaac were sacrificed. Once again probable arguments 
do not seem to play a role in the way that the late-medievals 
envisaged, because in so far as reason tells us anything it is that 
the Abrahamic narrative is false, and not that it is probably true.  
It is important to recognise, however, that even if we 
acknowledge the absurdity of the idea of the sacrifice of one’s 
beloved child, and the absurdity of the idea of the inheritance of 
the world by your seed despite the fact that you have no seed, 
we are not thereby committed to the view that they must 
therefore be false or invalid. An alternative position, accepted, I 
think, by both Pascal and Shestov, is that we lack the mental 
apparatus required to grasp the message. Which leaves open the 
possibility that the message, now inaudible to us, is in fact true. 
Pascal indeed had faith that it is true; it is probable that Shestov, 
with regret, withheld belief that it is true, but certain that he 
rejected arguments supporting the claim that the narrative must 
be false.13 
A comment with much the same form can be made 
regarding the third case I want to examine concerning an assent 
of faith whose object seems crazy, namely the doctrine of 
original sin, at least on Pascal’s understanding of it. In this case 
the absurd object of faith is the culpability imputable to all the 
descendants of Adam for the sin of disobedience that Adam 
committed, a culpability that seemingly makes no sense given 
that agents not born nor even conceived till after the commission 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13  Léon Chestov, Athènes et Jérusalem, tr. B. de Schloezer, ed. Ramona Fotiade. 
Paris; Le Bruit du temps, 2011, pp. 272-84. 
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of Adam’s sin could not be culpable of anything prior to their 
conception nor therefore culpable of that first act of 
disobedience. One has to be alive if one is to be culpable. To 
deny this is surely to infringe the law of non-contradiction. 
Pascal, on Shestov’s reasonable interpretation, holds that 
nothing could more rouse our reason and conscience to 
indignation than the mystery of the Fall and of original sin, and 
he also holds that original sin is absurd and impossible. But, as 
with the previous two archetypal cases of assent of faith, so also 
with this third, we need to bear in mind the fact that something’s 
being absurd, impossible or contradictory does not mean, in the 
mind of Pascal or of Shestov, that the message is therefore false. 
Perhaps we cannot conceive how a contradictory proposition 
can be true, but even though God did not in fact bestow on us 
such a power of conception, perhaps he could have done. 
Shestov sums this up: ‘Original sin appears to us as the 
incarnation of all that we consider immoral, shameful, absurd 
and impossible. But Pascal tells us that the greatest truth is 
there.’14 Sufficient to note that this heroic stance by Pascal, and 
indeed by Shestov also, is contrary to the doctrine of the relation 
between faith and reason with which I began. Shestov aligns this 
insight with the phrase on the famous sheet of paper that Pascal 
sewed into his clothing. There Pascal displayed his detachment 
from hellenistic philosophy with the affirmation: ‘God of 
Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob – not of the philosophers 
and the sages’.15 For the doctrine of original sin, an article of 
faith that informs Christianity as deeply as any of Christianity’s 
articles of faith, is so far from being a probable truth that it is 
here described as absurd and impossible, and it can therefore in 
no way serve as the conclusion of a probable argument. To 
which it has to be added, for the last time in this paper, to 
emphasise the anti-hellenistic stance of Pascal and of Shestov, 
that neither of these philosophers thinks that the absurdity and 
impossibility of the aforementioned article of faith imply that 
the article is not true.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14  Sur la balance de Job, p. 492. 
15  Sur la balance de Job, p. 492. 
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Regarding the analysis of the assent of faith, there is at least 
one significant similarity between Pascal’s position on the one 
hand and that of my late-medieval theologians on the other. For 
the latter group wrote as if the assent of faith arrives via logic, 
through the will working on the conclusion of a probable 
argument; and Pascal, who is of course famous as a founding 
father of probability theory, promoted the idea of a wager 
consisting of a movement that starts with a probable argument 
concerning the advantages of assenting to the proposition that 
God exists as against the disadvantages of not assenting, and 
that then proceeds to the conclusion that the person making the 
wager has nothing to lose and everything to gain by giving his 
assent to the proposition that God exists, so that there is no 
obstacle, and every incentive, to him or her judging, as an act of 
faith, that God exists.16 If that is a fair statement of Pascal’s 
wager, then the wager does indeed seem significantly similar to 
the position of my late-medievals. 
However, the foregoing statement of Pascal’s wager is 
incorrect and it is instructive to see why. In a word, the 
freethinker who, on the basis of Pascal’s argument, wagers that 
God exists is not described by Pascal as thereby giving his (the 
freethinker’s) assent, in the proper sense of ‘assent’, to the 
proposition that God exists. If, in the proper sense, to assent to 
the proposition p, is to hold p to be true, then neither does the 
freethinker promptly assent to ‘God exists’, nor does Pascal 
think that the freethinker will promptly assent to it -  quite the 
contrary. The freethinker’s response to the argument in support 
of  the wager is: ‘I am being forced to wager and I am not free: I 
am not being released and I am so made that I cannot believe. 
So what do you want me to do?’ The reply given by Pascal is 
that the freethinker should work to reduce his passions and not 
work to convince himself by increasing the number of proofs of 
God, and the way to do this is to imitate people who ‘behaved as 
if they did believe, taking the holy water, having masses said, 
and so on. By natural means, that will make you believe and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16  Pensées, ed. G. Ferreyrolles, (fragment 680). 
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will habituate you17.’ This is quite unlike the late-medieval case 
where the argument has produced assent, even if it is of the 
hesitant kind.  For in the Pascalian case we are to suppose that 
the freethinker remains a freethinker despite the fact that the 
argument has made a difference to him, to the extent that he has 
decided, as an immediate result of the argument, to behave as if 
he assents. However, to decide to behave as if one does assent to 
articles of faith cannot be construed as an assent of faith, even if 
the outcome of the behaviour is the acquisition of faith, and 
even if the agent undertook the new pattern of behaviour with a 
view to his eventually giving an assent of faith.  
The role of the wager in Pascal’s argument is therefore 
quite different from the role of the probable argument in the 
late-medieval narrative about the genesis of the assent of faith. 
To this there should be added a further difference, that the late-
medievals were setting out the criteria that have to be satisfied 
by any act of assent that is an assent of faith, whereas Pascal is 
not doing any such thing in his discussion of the wager. In 
particular he does not suggest that every assent of faith must be 
underpinned by a wager. Indeed he is not even thinking of the 
premisses that lead directly to an assent of faith, but is thinking 
instead of premisses leading to an adoption of the idea of 
working towards the assent of faith by means of an imitation of 
the behavour of real believers, an imitation of the real believers’ 
participation in the Mass and in receiving the holy water, and so 
on.  
The whole emphasis of Pascal’s account of the assent of 
faith lies elsewhere than with probable arguments. The spiritual 
journey of the Shestovian Pascal whom I have been discussing 
contains not a wager but an existential moment, a shock of 
cosmic proportions that transformed him intellectually, morally 
and spiritually, and was bound to transform his theology also. 
The Shestovian Pascal became as if a new person, persuaded 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  	   ‘Vous abêtira’: What does Pascal signify by s’abêtir? I follow Gérard 
Ferreyrolles’s interpretation, that it means using what is common to humans 
and animals, viz. the ‘machine’ of the body, to incline or dispose oneself to 
belief, by repetitious behaviour that becomes customary. Pensées, ed. 
Ferreyrolles, (fragment 680), p.465, fn.1. 
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that the truth lies not in Aristotelian logic but in absurdities or 
impossibilities, and certainly not in the conclusions of probable 
arguments. This is what I referred to as the underlying fact that 
drives the narrative of the Pensées. His doctrine of the assent of 
faith, a faith not acquired by an engagement of the will, but 
instead blasted into being by a spiritual shock cosmic in its 
implications, is worlds away from the position taught at the 
University of Paris by John Mair and his colleagues. I do not 
suggest that one should never use the term ‘assent of faith’ in 
accordance with the account of it provided by many late-
medieval writers. But I do believe that Pascal’s account of the 
assent of faith, developed by him in the course of trying to make 
sense not only of the deeply mysterious Biblical narratives 
concerning original sin, the binding of Isaac and the agony of 
Jesus in the Garden, but also of his own experience of the God 
of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, is no less compelling than, and in 
many ways reaches deeper down into human nature, than does 
the doctrine of the late-medievals.18  
 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  	   My thanks to Gérard Ferreyrolles and Laurent Jaffro for their helpful 
comments. 
